Abstract This paper extends Noe's (Rev Financial Studies 15:289-317, 2002) model of large shareholder activism in two directions. First, it considers a framework in which large shareholders can choose not only when to monitor, but also how intensively they want to monitor the firm. Second, it considers the impact of laws and regulations by introducing a governance quality parameter that makes monitoring more cost effective. The model yields a new and rich characterization of activism. We find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces monitoring for higher firm value through more frequent monitoring with unchanged intensity. Cash wealth motivates activism for trading gains, not higher firm value, through less frequent monitoring coupled with higher intensity. We also find that better governance leads to higher firm value through more frequent but less intense activism. When asymmetries within the group of large shareholders exist, the model predicts that the larger/wealthier/more efficient shareholders are more active. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
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Introduction
Extensive research has been conducted on large shareholder activism. However, several important questions on the topic remain unanswered. First, there is a lot of variation in large shareholder activism. Some large shareholders such as the institutional investor CalPERS spend significant resources on monitoring the firms they invest in (e.g. Smith 1996) , whereas others do not engage in activism at all. There is also great variation in styles of activism. Some large shareholders prefer long-term activism such as analyst coverage and relationship investing (e.g. Warren Buffett's long term relationship with Coca Cola); others engage in short-term but forceful activism (e.g. Carl Icahn's showdown with Time Warner, or Kirk Kerkorian's showdown with General Motors). It is unclear why such variation exists.
Second, it is unclear how activism enhances firm value, if at all. Some studies find activism to be associated with higher firm value, whereas others find no relation. 1 Moreover, not only activism (monitoring, takeovers, relationship-investing) but also alternative protective mechanisms such as laws, regulations, and corporate culture can affect firm value (e.g. Bebchuk et al. 2009 ). In particular, it is well established that countries with relatively strong shareholder protection, such as the US and UK, feature higher valuation of corporate assets relative to regions with poor shareholder protection, such as Italy and East Asia (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2002) . It is less clear, however, how activism interacts with such alternative protective mechanisms to determine firm value.
Lastly, most of the existing theoretical literature about activism considers only a single large shareholder. 2 However, increasing evidence suggests that most firms have multiple large shareholders (see, for example, Dlugosz et al. 2006; Holderness 2009 ). Activism of multiple large shareholders may differ from that of a single large shareholder. For example, noncoordinated monitoring may result in duplications and inefficiencies. Further, a large shareholder's trading decision may be different when the firm has multiple large shareholders. Raiders generally benefit based on the information about their monitoring by buying a toehold before engaging in activism and selling their shares abruptly when they decide to stop monitoring. 3 It is unclear how a raider's decision about monitoring and trading may change when she has to consider the decisions of other large shareholders.
In this paper, we develop a model of large shareholders activism to answer these questions. The model has four important features. First, it has multiple (two) noncooperating large shareholders that can engage in activism (monitoring). Second, these large shareholders can choose both the frequency and the intensity with which they monitor. Third, financial markets in which large shareholders can trade to benefit from the private information that their activism generates are available. Lastly, firm value depends not only on activism but also on the quality of protective mechanisms that are beyond shareholders' control, namely exogenous governance mechanisms. 4 Under these assumptions we investigate the large shareholders' monitoring and trading decisions, and the resulting firm value.
Our paper uses Noe (2002) as a starting point. Noe considers multiple large shareholders who can both monitor and trade. He explicitly models the market, as well as the information asymmetry generated by activism where activism is identified with monitoring. He demonstrates that trading does not necessarily lead to the absence of monitoring, because market prices may dictate that monitoring and buying, or even monitoring and holding, can be more beneficial than selling. 5 Another elegant result of Noe's model is that investors choose different frequencies (probability) with which they monitor. However, large shareholders cannot choose the intensity with which they monitor in Noe's model. As a result the relation between ownership and monitoring is nonmonotonic. Namely, among investors who choose activism, those with the smallest holdings are the most aggressive. While this result is very interesting, it may not reflect most real life situations. We introduce the ability of large shareholders to choose the intensity with which they monitor, i.e., the amount they spend on monitoring when they do monitor, into Noe's framework. We also introduce the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms. In this generalized framework we then investigate how the monitoring decision, the associated trading decision, and firm value depend on the large shareholders characteristics (cash and share wealth) and on the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms.
Our results suggest that the optimal monitoring strategy for large shareholders is characterized by both frequency and intensity. In particular, we find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces more frequent monitoring with unchanged intensity, which, in turn, results in higher firm value; Intuitively, a share-wealthy (vested) investor cares about the firm value. The more shares he owns, the higher his incentive to monitor and the higher the firm value. However, because of diminishing returns to monitoring he is better off monitoring more through increased frequency rather than through higher intensity. In contrast, we find that cash wealth induces less frequent monitoring coupled with higher intensity and does not enhance firm value; Intuitively, unlike a share-wealthy investor, a cash-wealthy investor cares about the firm value only when he buys shares. The greater his cash hoard, the more he wants to monitor, when he monitors. However, because his monitoring is motivated by trading gains rather than by value appreciation of shares held, he is better off "hiding" the information that he (buys shares and) monitors by reducing the frequency with which he monitors and increasing the intensity with which he monitors, when he monitors. Firm value is not enhanced because of the lower frequency of monitoring. With respect to the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms (laws, regulations), the model predicts that higher quality of these mechanisms leads to more frequent monitoring, but less spending on monitoring when monitoring occurs, which, in turn, results in higher firm value. Intuitively this is because of the substitutability between the quality of the exogenous mechanisms and monitoring and because of higher efficiency of the monitoring.
We also investigate how activism depends on asymmetries within the group of large shareholders. We find, that among large shareholders, larger ones monitor more because their benefit from enhancing the firm value is higher. Thus, unlike in Noe (2002) , the relationship between share wealth and monitoring is monotonic. Similarly, cash-wealthier shareholders monitor more because their trading gains from monitoring are higher, and shareholders whose monitoring is more efficient monitor more because of higher marginal benefit from monitoring, both through value appreciation and trade. Lastly, our analysis suggests that monitoring of multiple large shareholders is similar in terms of frequency and intensity to that of a single large shareholder and that large shareholders use similar monitoring strategies in terms of intensity and frequency of monitoring whether or not they cooperate their monitoring with one another.
The model predictions are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence. Consistent with the model, vested investors such as pension funds rely heavily on high frequency-high intensity activism such as analyst coverage and investor relations rather than on special shareholder meetings or proxy fights, and their activism leads to value enhancement (see, for example, Smith 1996; Carlton et al. 1998; Becht et al. 2009) . Consistent with the model, cash rich investors such as corporate raiders, monitor for trading gains (through value appreciation of shares purchased) rather than firm value, and tend to use low frequency-high intensity activism in the form of proxy fights, special shareholder meetings, referendums and scrutiny of management and their activism often does not result in value enhancement (see, for example, Bradley et al. 2009 ). An important implication of the model is that the ambiguity in empirical studies about the relation between activism and value, discussed above, exists because, as we show in the paper, activism may or may not lead to higher firm value. Specifically, activism motivated by ownership concentration enhances firm value, whereas activism motivated for trading gains may not. Consistent with the model, corporate value is positively correlated with the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms (see, for example, La Porta et al. 1998; Bebchuk et al. 2009 ). We are unaware, however, of empirical evidence on the relation between the quality of governance and styles of activism. The model predicts, for example, that in countries with better investor protection through laws and regulations, such as the US and the UK, shareholder activism will be characterized with higher frequency and lower intensity in comparison to activism in countries with poor investor protection. Similarly, the model predicts that following legislation that improves the quality of laws and regulations such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, large shareholder activism will become more frequent and less intense.
Our main contributions are three: first, we characterize large shareholders activism on two dimensions: frequency and the intensity. Second, we investigate how the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms affects large shareholders activism and firm value. To our knowledge this is the first model to perform such an investigation. Lastly, our generalization of Noe (2002) allows us to explain and support a broader set of monitoring styles. For example, Noe's model predicts that among the shareholders who monitor, the larger ones monitor less, whereas our model supports the intuitive result that larger shareholders monitor more. A detailed comparison to Noe (2002) is given in Sect. 4.3.
In addition to Noe (2002) , a number of other models consider multiple activists and the important tensions associated with the interaction among them. Winton (1993) investigates how monitoring of multiple large shareholders depends on capital structure. He shows that monitoring increases in the liability of their shares. Winton does not allow for trade and suggests that if large shareholders could trade freely they would sell off and there will be no monitoring. Cornelli and Li (2002) , Attari et al. (2006) and Goldstein and Guembel (2008) study the trading strategies of multiple large shareholders. They investigate how these large shareholders trade to benefit from private information and how market prices are affected. They do not consider the agency problem, namely, they do not consider the value enhancement through monitoring.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model for large shareholders activism (monitoring) that abstracts from exogenous governance mechanisms and characterizes equilibrium monitoring strategies. Section 3 introduces a quality of governance parameter (i.e. the quality of laws, regulations) into the model. Section 4 solves the model and presents results on how ownership concentration, nonshare wealth, and governance quality determine shareholders activism and firm value. Section 5 discusses empirical implications, and Sect. 6 concludes.
A simple model of shareholder activism
In this section we present a simple model of large shareholder activism with diminishing returns to activism, and provide a general characterization of equilibrium monitoring strategies and market prices. We defer the introduction of exogenous governance mechanisms to Sect. 3. Our notation is similar to that of Noe (2002) .
Assumptions and notation
Assume a one period, risk-neutral economy with no taxes, no transaction costs, and an interest rate of zero. We consider an all-equity-financed firm with one share outstanding owned by n − 2 nonstrategic small investors and two strategic large investors (henceforth "small investors" and "investors," respectively). The two strategic investors are indexed by subscript i ∈ {1, 2}. For these two investors, let (φ 0 i , b 0 i ) denote investor i's endowment, where φ 0 i > 0 denotes share endowment, b 0 i > 0 denotes riskless bond (cash) endowment, and the superscript 0 indicates beginning of period.
The firm is run by a manager. All investors (small or large) are outsiders in the sense that they have access to public information and have conflicts of interest with the manager. The terminal value of the firm depends solely on shareholder activism: higher level of activism reduces the probability that the manager will shirk or steal from the firm. The value of the firm is normalized to Q 0 when the manager shirks or steals and to Q 0 +1 when he does not do so. For compactness of the strategy space Q 0 is assumed to be an arbitrary small but positive constant. We identify shareholder activism with monitoring and assume that monitoring is the only way for shareholders to affect the firm value. 6 Only the two large investors can monitor the manager. Let 0 ≤ c i denote the amount of money that investor i can spend on monitoring which is bounded by some (very) high limit, and let c = (c 1 , c 2 ). We follow Noe (2002) in assuming that the cost of monitoring c i does not come out of the cash available for trade
denote the firm value as a function of monitoring and let Q(0, 0) = Q 0 . Equivalently, we can assume that Q − Q 0 represents the probability that monitoring will prevent the manager from shirking/stealing when investors 1 and 2 spend c 1 and c 2 on monitoring, respectively. Let v denote the expected firm value. Then v = E [Q] . Assume also that Q has continuous second-order derivatives. We make the following assumptions on the functional form for Q. First, ∂ Q/∂c i > 0, i.e. firm value increases in monitoring of either of the large shareholders. Second, ∂ 2 Q/∂c 2 i < 0, i.e. returns to monitoring are diminishing. 8 Last, ∂ Q (0, 0) /∂c i > 1, i.e. the benefit from monitoring must be high enough to justify monitoring.
There is a market in which investors can trade their shares. At the beginning of the period, a zero-expected-profit market maker posts bid-ask prices p = ( p A , p B ) at which he is willing to buy and sell any quantity of shares, respectively. The riskless bond price is 1 (since the interest rate is zero). Borrowing and shortselling are not allowed. 9 Let φ i and b i denote investor i's post-trade shares and post-trade bonds, respectively. For given (φ i , b i ), the total expenditure by investor i on purchasing shares is (φ i − φ 0 i ) + p A where x + ≡ max [x, 0] . The proceeds from the sale of endowment stock is (φ 0 i − φ i ) + p B . The budget constraint implies that bond holdings after trade are given by
Denote the largest possible post-trade holding for investor i with 6 We think of shareholder activism as including all actions that investors can take (naturally at a cost) to increase the value of the firm. In Sect. 3, the model is generalized to allow factors that are currently beyond the control of shareholders to affect firm value (i.e., laws, regulations, the corporate charters, etc.) 7 Relaxing this assumption should not change the qualitative results of the paper but will significantly complicate the analysis. Imposing a limit on c i is to assure compactness of the monitoring strategy and is consistent with investors having limited wealth. 8 Noe (2002) , for example, assumes a fixed cost of monitoring, c * , and that monitoring by one investor is sufficient to prevent shirking. This is equivalent to assuming Q(c 1 , The tree from a can be simplified to the tree below. Investor i's after-trade shareholding is either¯ i (Buy), or 0 i (Hold), or 0 (Sell). Given shareholding choice each investor chooses a unique monitoring level c iB when they buy and c iH when they hold. Investors never sell when they monitor and never buy when they do not monitor. The probability that investor i assigns to {Monitor and Buy} is q iB and the probability that investor i assigns to {Monitor and Hold} is q iH . If he does not monitor then the investor either holds or sells (he never mixes)
The game between investors
The game between the two investors is one with simultaneous moves with perfect information on endowments. Figure 1a describes the game tree. In this game, investor i's strategy specifies the number of shares to trade, φ i − φ 0 i (i.e., his choice of φ i for a given φ 0 i ) and the amount of cash to spend on monitoring, c i . To allow for the possibility of mixed strategies, let C i ≥ 0 denote investor i's mixed monitoring strategy. Similarly let i ∈ [0,φ] denote investor i's mixed shareholding strategy. Note that c i and φ i , defined earlier, are elements of C i and i , respectively. Also define = ( 1 , 2 ) and C = (C 1 , C 2 ). Noncooperative monitoring implies corr(C 1 , C 2 ) = 0. Investors are expected utility maximizers. Let u i denote investor i's utility function. Investor i chooses a strategy to maximize his expected utility given the strategy of the other investor. Specifically, the objective function for investor i is
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a triple, ( * , C * , p * ( * , C * )), consisting of trading strategies * , monitoring strategies C * , and bid and ask prices p * . This triple satisfies the following conditions: (i) the strategies ( * 1 , C * 1 ) and ( * 2 , C * 2 ) are independent; (ii) the market maker's expected profit is zero, and (iii) for investor i
for all i , C i and i = 1, 2.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium always exists.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Investors' optimization problem
We now define the optimization problems for the large investors. Note that because both investors are risk-neutral, maximizing their expected utility is equivalent to maximizing their expected post-trade wealth. Investor 1 chooses C 1 and 1 to maximize his expected post-trade wealth given C 2 and 2 . That is, investor 1 solves
for given C 2 and 2 where
is the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of C 1 and 1 . The first term inside
is the value of investor 1's after-trade bond holdings (a direct result of (1)). The second term is the value of his after-trade share holdings. The second term suggests that for given φ 1 and C 2 investor 1 will spend c 1 > 0 on monitoring only if
where E C 2 [·] is the expectation with respect to the distribution of C 2 . Investor 2 solves a symmetric problem.
Properties of equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium of the game. We first describe the market mechanism and derive the equilibrium prices set by the market maker. We then identify properties of the investors' equilibrium strategies which would allow us to simplify the game tree and characterize equilibrium strategies and profits. By construction, if monitoring level is fixed our model boils down to Noe (2002) . We compare our results to Noe's in Sect. 4.3. 
Equilibrium market prices
The dollar value of buy-side demand and sell-side supply from strategic investors is given by
, respectively. Unlike the two strategic (large) investors, nonstrategic (small) investors trade for liquidity reasons. We assume that the dollar value of buy-side demand from nonstrategic investors is given by an exogenous random variable L B and that the sell-side supply in shares from nonstrategic investors is given by an exogenous random number l S . 10 The buy-side demand in shares from nonstrategic investors is given by
The zero expected profit condition for the market maker is:
Solving Eqs. (6) and (7) for p * A and p * B yields the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
The equilibrium ask price satisfies
and the equilibrium bid price satisfies
Note that cov(D * B , Q * ) > 0 implies p * A > v * . This is because when strategic purchases are positively correlated with monitoring, the market maker sets the ask price to be higher than the unconditional expected value to compensate for this adverse selection. Similarly, cov(d * s , Q * ) < 0 implies p * B < v * because when strategic sells are negatively correlated with monitoring, the market maker has to set the bid price to be lower than the expected value. Note also that since the stock value can never fall below Q 0 then p * B can never fall below Q 0 (Otherwise, the zero expected profit condition to the market maker in the sell market would not hold.) As a result, we have
Properties of equilibrium strategies
Next we characterize the equilibrium strategies of the large investors. To do so, we first establish (in Lemmas 2-4) properties that allow us to eliminate dominated strategies.
Lemma 2 Given a monitoring level c i ≥ 0, optimally, investor i either sells all shares, or holds, or spends all available cash to buy shares.
Intuitively, the utility function for investor i (the maximand in (4) for either investor) is convex in φ i on each of the segments [0,
Hence, the optimal shareholding strategy for investor i is one of the three end points 0, φ 0 i , andφ i . Thus he has a bang-bang solution on portfolio weights. Denote the corresponding shareholding strategies for investor i with {Sell}, {Hold}, and {Buy}. The following Lemma further restricts equilibrium shareholdings.
Lemma 3 (i) When investor i monitors, he never sells. (ii) When investor i does not monitor, he never buys.
The intuition for (i) is that an investor will never spend resources in order to increase the value of a stock if he plans to sell. The intuition for (ii) is as follows: since the ask price reflects the probability of adverse selection through monitoring and buying, it is higher than the expected value, given that the investor does not monitor
. Thus the strategy {Not Monitor and Buy} is always strictly dominated by the strategy {Not Monitor and Hold}. In fact, it can be observed from the second term inside E C 1 , 1 [·] in (4) that when investor i does not monitor, he sells if p B > v * −i and holds otherwise. This choice is less important than the decision to hold or buy when he does monitor (since no spending on monitoring is involved). Hence, with a little abuse of notation, we will generally use {Not Monitor} for both {Not Monitor and Hold} and {Not Monitor and Sell} without specifying.
Lemma 4 When investor i's strategy involves monitoring, he does not mix on his monitoring level c i given shareholding choice φ i . Specifically, investor i monitors with a unique monitoring level c i B if he buys and a unique monitoring level c i H if he holds.
Intuitively, by assumption, the firm value is concave in the amount that investor i spends on monitoring. Hence, any strategy that involves mixing on monitoring expenditure is dominated by the strategy of spending the average amount. Based on the above Lemmas, we have the following Proposition: Proposition 2 allows us to simplify the decision tree for investor i from Fig. 1a to the three-branch decision tree in Fig. 1b . When investor i chooses not to monitor, he either holds or sells all his shares. When he chooses to monitor, he either holds and monitors with one level denoted by c i H , or buys shares with all available cash and monitors with a possibly different monitoring level c i B . Investors' strategies may still involve mixing on the pure strategies in Proposition 2. To allow for such mixing, we denote the probability that investor i assigns to {Monitor and Buy} with q i B ∈ [0, 1] and the probability that investor i assigns to {Monitor and Hold} with q i H ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, c i B , c i H , represent the intensity with which the investors monitor whereas q i B , q i H , represent the frequency with which they monitor.
Definition 2 A mixed equilibrium is an equilibrium in which, at least for some investor i, q i B ∈ (0, 1) or q i H ∈ (0, 1). That is, at least one investor mixes between two or more of the pure strategies {Monitor and Buy},{Monitor and Hold}, {Not Monitor}. A fully mixed equilibrium is an equilibrium in which q i B ∈ (0, 1), q i H ∈ (0, 1), and q i B + q i H < 1, for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 1 Every equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium.
By Theorem 1, a pure strategy equilibrium is not possible because of the free riding problem. Note, however, that we do not rule out an equilibrium in which one investor plays a mixed strategy and the other plays a pure strategy. In such an equilibrium, the investor that holds would free ride (gain) when the other investor monitors but loses when the other investor does not monitor. Indeed, Sect. 4.2 demonstrates, for example, that with enough asymmetry between the large shareholders one investor never monitors and the other investor monitors with probability between 0 and 1.
Equilibrium profits
Next, we characterize equilibrium profits. Recall that c i B is the optimal monitoring level for investor i when he monitors and buys, and let
Namely, v +i B is the expected firm value when investor i spends c i B on monitoring with probability 1, given the other investor's strategy, ( −i , C −i ), which might involve mixing. Similarly let
Define M P i B to be the excess expected profit for investor i from the strategy {Mon-itor and Buy} as opposed to the strategy {Not Monitor} given the other investor's strategy (henceforth "monitoring profit"). Then
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is the trading gain on the cash endowment. With the strategy {Monitor and Buy} each cash-endowment dollar invested in shares yields
whereas with the strategy {Not Monitor} the cash-endowment is retained. The second term is the gain from monitoring on the share endowment. With the strategy {Monitor and Buy} the value of each share becomes v +i B . With the strategy {Not Monitor} the shares are sold if p B > v −i and held otherwise, so that the proceeds on each share are max( p B , v −i ). Similarly, define M P i H to be the excess expected monitoring profit for investor i from the strategy {Monitor and Hold} as opposed to the strategy {Not Monitor}. Then
This profit reflects only the gain on the share endowment, as in both strategies, {Moni-tor and Hold} and {Not Monitor}, the cash endowment is retained (there are no trading profits). Note that M P i B and M P i H are nonnegative. The market maker compensates himself for the expected losses to informed (large) investors with profits that he makes from trading with the liquidity (small) investors. Given ( −i , C −i ) and p, investor i's net profit (i.e., monitoring profit less monitoring cost) from {Monitor and Buy} as opposed to {Not Monitor} is M P i B − c i B ; and the net profit from {Monitor and Hold} as opposed to {Not Monitor} is M P i H − c i H . His best response is the strategy that yields the highest profit. For example, if
then investor i's best response is {Monitor and Hold} with probability 1. The following Lemma characterizes the relation between the probabilities with which each of these three strategies are played in equilibrium and the corresponding equilibrium profits.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium, for each investor i,
Lemma 5 summarizes restrictions on equilibrium strategies and profits based on the requirement that all strategies played in equilibrium must provide the investor with the same net gain. For example, if investor i's equilibrium strategy is to mix between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor}, then it must be the case that both strategies provide the same gain. That is, investor i's net equilibrium profit from monitoring is zero. Indeed, since in this case q * i B > 0 and 1 − q
Similarly, in a fully mixed equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium in which all three strategies are played with positive probabilities by both investors), it must be the case that for both investors the excess expected monitoring profit equals the associated monitoring costs. Indeed, for each investor i, q * i B > 0 and q * i H > 0 and
Governance quality
In this section, we investigate how varying corporate governance quality, both in terms of external factors such as national laws, regulations, corporate culture, and corporate charter, and in terms of investor specific factors, affects shareholder activism. Investors may rely on varying sources of information, for instance some investors use advice from own analysts whereas other investors rely on internal contacts, and these investor specific factors may make them more or less effective as active shareholders. We first outline how we can define parameters that introduce governance quality into the framework, and then show how equilibrium is defined given the new parameters.
The specialized governance function
In this subsection we describe how we can augment the activism function Q(c 1 , c 2 ) with an augmented governance function Q(α, c) ≡ Q(α 1 , α 2 , c 1 , c 2 ) that incorporates governance quality parameters α 1 and α 2 to represent the quality of the governance provision by shareholder 1 and 2, respectively. We assume the following specific form of Q(α, c):
where α i > 1. This functional form captures substitutability between the investors' activism as well as increasing but diminishing returns to monitoring across investors (i.e., ∂ 2 Q/∂c 1 ∂c 2 < 0). It captures substitutability between quality of exogenous mechanisms α and monitoring c. 11 It also captures increasing but diminishing returns to α. The requirement α i > 1 assures that ∂ Q(0, 0)/∂c i > 1 holds for this specific functional form. Other functional forms can be used, but may not be as good in capturing the above features. The functional form (16) preserves all the properties of Q in relation to c that we assumed in Sect. 2; thus, all results from Sect. 2 still hold. Under (16) we can simplify
where
and
As indicated in Proposition 2, under the strategy {Not Monitor}, investor i may either hold or sell depending on whether or not v * −1 ≥ p * B . In order to solve for the equilibrium it is helpful to define a variable for shareholding level under this strategy. Let φ i N M denote the number of shares investor i holds when he does not monitor. Accordingly,
and where v * −1 and v * −2 are given in (18) and (19), respectively.
Equilibrium
Based on the analysis in Sect. 2 and given the governance function (16), we can derive a system of equations that determines the equilibrium. To do so, we first establish the equilibrium prices and the optimal monitoring in Lemmas 6 and 7, respectively. Upon substitution of the governance function (16) into the bid and ask prices (8) and (9) given in Lemma 1, we have the following results on equilibrium prices:
Lemma 6 Under the governance function (16) the equilibrium ask price is
and the equilibrium bid price is
, and φ 2N M are given in Eqs. (17), (20 )- (23), respectively.
Upon substitution of the governance function (16) into the optimization problem (4) we have the following results on optimal monitoring levels:
Lemma 7 Under the governance function (16) the optimal monitoring levels are as follows:
In equilibrium, the market maker sets prices p * A , p * B , and each large investor i chooses a mixed strategy that includes the following:
(1) Probability of playing the pure strategy {Monitoring and Buy}, q * i B , and the corresponding monitoring intensity, c * i B , where under this strategy he spends all his cash endowment on buying shares and eventually holdsφ
(2) Probability of playing the pure strategy {Monitor and Hold}, q (35)- (46), given in the proof of Proposition 3, provides a framework with which to solve for the values of these parameters.
Results on corporate governance
This section presents results on the impacts of share wealth (ownership concentration), cash wealth, and quality of the protective mechanisms that are beyond the shareholders control (exogenous governance mechanisms) on the large shareholder monitoring strategy (frequency and intensity), the associated trading strategy (buy, sell, or hold), and the resulting firm value. We derive these results by solving the corporate governance model from Sect. 3 (essentially the system of Eqs. 35-46) and performing comparative statics. Because the system is highly nonlinear, an analytical solution is not available to our knowledge. Therefore, numerical techniques (Newton-Raphson method) were used. 12 Section 4.1 reports the results for the symmetric case, i.e., when both investors own the same number of shares, have the same amount of cash, and have access to identical monitoring technology. Section 4.2 describes how the results change when these symmetries are relaxed. Section 4.3 compares our results to those of Noe (2002) . Before moving to the results, the next paragraph offers introductory intuition for the analysis to follow.
Our analysis suggests that five major forces shape the equilibrium outcome. These forces are the substitutability between the quality of exogenous mechanisms and monitoring, diminishing return to monitoring, lack of coordination of monitoring, adverse selection, and free riding. The first force, the substitutability between the quality of exogenous mechanisms and monitoring, implies that higher quality of exogenous mechanisms leads to lower spending on monitoring when monitor occurs (lower intensity). The second force, diminishing returns to activism (monitoring), motivates the large shareholders to monitor more frequently and spend less on monitoring when they monitor. The third force, lack of coordination of monitoring, causes duplication between the monitoring of the large shareholders and results in inefficient monitoring because of diminishing returns to monitoring (i.e., excessive monitoring). This force motivates less frequent monitoring, with more spending on monitoring when monitoring occurs, in order to avoid duplication. The fourth force, adverse selection, results from the information asymmetry generated by monitoring (only shareholders who monitor are informed about their monitoring). Like the third force, adverse selection encourages less frequent monitoring, with more spending on monitoring when monitoring occurs as its purpose is to generate trading gains, rather than to increase firm value. The last force, free riding, exists because only investors who monitor bear the costs of monitoring, whereas gains are enjoyed by all shareholders. The tension among the above forces determines the equilibrium outcome.
Symmetric equilibrium
In this subsection we assume that investors are symmetric, i.e. φ 0
We consider the symmetric equilibrium in which equilibrium strategies are symmetric and for which we can write
We investigate how the equilibrium (the solution to the system of Eqs. 35-46) changes in response to changes in initial stake in the firm, φ 0 , cash wealth, b 0 , and quality of the exogenous mechanisms, α. We change one parameter at a time while holding all other parameters fixed. All symmetric equilibria obtained were nonfully mixed. The strategy {Monitor and Hold} was never played in symmetric equilibrium. That is, in all symmetric equilibria obtained, q H = 0, c H = 0. Both investors mix between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor}, and they always sell when they do not monitor ( The main results from the analysis of the symmetric case are as follows: We find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces monitoring for firm value. This is done through monitoring with higher frequency but unchanged intensity because of diminishing returns to monitoring. In contrast, nonshare wealth induces monitoring for trading gains rather than value. This is done through monitoring with higher intensity but lower frequency, so that the large shareholders can better hide the information that they monitor and increase their trading gains. With respect to the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms, we find that higher quality of the exogenous mechanisms is associated with monitoring with higher frequency but lower intensity because of the substitutability between the quality of the exogenous mechanism and monitoring.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 use graphs to illustrate comparative statics results for the symmetric case. Figure 2 demonstrates that higher ownership concentration induces higher frequency of monitoring, with unchanged intensity. As a result, expected expenditure on monitoring and expected firm value both increase with ownership concentration. Intuitively, a share-wealthy (vested) investor cares about the firm value. The more shares he owns, the higher his incentive to monitor becomes. However, because of diminishing returns to monitoring, he is better off monitoring more by increasing the frequency of monitoring than by increasing the intensity. The bid-ask spread increases with ownership concentration when ownership concentration is low, but decreases with ownership concentration when ownership concentration is high, reflecting how adverse selection changes with stock endowment. Adverse selection, in turn, depends on the variability in the firm value introduced through monitoring, and on the investors' ability to explore this variability through trade. Thus, small ownership means both little ability for strategic selling (because the ownership is small) and low benefits from strategic buying because buying is rare. Large ownership means both little ability for strategic buying (because as the ask price increases the number of shares each large shareholder can buy with fixed cash is small) and low benefits from strategic selling because selling is rare. (See Fig. 2 for further discussion.) Figure 3 shows that higher cash wealth induces more intensive but less frequent monitoring while expected expenditure on monitoring, and hence expected monitoring and firm value is unchanged. Intuitively, unlike a share-wealthy investor, a cashwealthy investor cares about the firm value only when he buys shares. The higher his cash hoard is, the more he wants to monitor, if he does monitor (his monitoring level must be optimal given the size of his holdings). However, in order to have mixing between monitoring and not monitoring in equilibrium, the probability of monitoring must fall. Reducing the frequency helps large investors "hide" the information that they monitor, whereas increasing the intensity increases the variability in the firm value, and therefore increases their trading gains. The figure also reveals that the ask price increases with cash wealth, because large investors have more cash for purchasing stock when they monitor, and hence buy-side adverse selection is higher. In contrast, the bid price is hardly affected, because stock ownership is fixed so that sell-side adverse selection does not change (short selling is not allowed). As a result, the bid-ask spread increases with cash wealth. Figure 4 depicts that higher quality of the exogenous governance mechanisms induces more frequent but less intensive monitoring. Expected firm value increases with the quality of the exogenous mechanisms, although expected expenditure on monitoring hardly increases. This outcome reflects the substitutability between the quality of the exogenous mechanisms and monitoring. Intuitively, as the quality of the governance mechanisms increases, returns to monitoring diminish more quickly; hence, the better the exogenous mechanisms, the lower the optimal amount each investor spends on monitoring when he monitors. Because higher quality of exogenous mechanisms implies that monitoring is more effective, investors monitor more frequently (with higher probability). However, the frequency of monitoring cannot be too large. If so, inefficiencies from lack of coordination of monitoring (duplication between the . a Demonstrates that the frequency of monitoring increases with stock endowment, while intensity of monitoring when it occurs, maintains a steady level. As a result, expected expenditure on monitoring, q B * c B , increases moderately. b Shows that the firm value increases with φ 0 because expected spending on monitoring increases with φ 0 . Consequently, both the bid and ask prices increase with φ 0 . The bid-ask spread increases for small values of φ 0 but decreases for large values of φ 0 , reflecting how adverse selection changes with stock endowment. Adverse selection, in turn, depends on the variability in the firm value introduced through monitoring (i.e., how different are v −1 , v, and v +1 ), and the investors' ability to explore this variability through trade. Low values of φ 0 mean both little ability for strategic selling because the ownership is small and low benefits from strategic buying because q B is low (monitoring and hence buying is rare). High values of φ 0 mean both little ability from strategic buying because the number of shares each large shareholder can buy is small and low benefits from strategic selling because q B is high (monitoring is high and hence selling is rare) Fig. 3 Monitoring, firm value, and prices as a function of cash wealth-symmetric case. This figure describes how equilibrium results change with the bond endowment, b 0 . a Demonstrates that as b 0 increases, the expected spending on monitoring remains relatively flat. However unlike with increases in φ 0 , the spending on monitoring when it occurs increases, while the frequency (probability) of monitoring actually decreases. b Shows that the expected firm value hardly increases with cash endowment since expected monitoring is relatively unchanged. The figure also depicts that, the ask price increases with b 0 but the bid price is unchanged. As a result the bid-ask spread increases with cash wealth. The ask price increases with b 0 because adverse selection in the buy market increases as large investors have more cash to buy stock with when they monitor. In contrast, the bid price is hardly affected by changes in b 0 because φ 0 is fixed; thus sell-side adverse selection does not change monitoring of the investors) and the incentive to free ride can become very large. The bid-ask spread increases in the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms and reflects how adverse selection changes with it. Adverse selection, in turn, increases because better exogenous governance mechanisms induce higher variability in the 
Fig. 4 Monitoring, firm value, and prices as a function of exogenous governance quality-symmetric case.
This figure describes how the equilibrium results change with the quality of the exogenous mechanisms, α. a Demonstrates that as α increases, the amount each investor spends in a monitoring event, c B , decreases, but the frequency each investor monitors with, q B , increases. As a result, expected spending on monitoring, q B * c B , is hardly changed. b Depicts an increase in firm value with α (even though expected spending on monitoring hardly changes, as shown in a). This is because higher quality of exogenous mechanisms makes monitoring more effective. b Also shows that both the bid and the ask prices increase with α since the firm value increases with α. The bid-ask spread increases in α because adverse selection introduced through monitoring increases with α. This is, in turn, because variability in the firm value introduced through the equilibrium value of αc B and q B (the frequency of monitoring) increases in α. Although c B decreases in α, as shown in Fig. 2a (because of diminishing returns) , αc B actually increases in α, thus increasing adverse selection. Adverse selection depends also on purchasing power captured by b 0 /P A . Since P A increases with α this acts to reduce adverse selection. However, this effect is not dominant firm value through monitoring (despite the resulting decrease in the expenditure on monitoring when monitoring occurs).
Naturally, the main influence of an increase in liquidity, either on the sell side or on the buy side (L or s), is to reduce the bid-ask spread because the impact of the informed trade on the prices is moderated by the volume (The market maker always makes zero profit). However, lower bid-ask spread, in turn, increases the motivation to monitor because it increases the trading gains and hence results in higher firm value (figures omitted).
Asymmetric equilibrium
In this subsection, we report results upon the introduction of asymmetries between the large shareholders, i.e., when investors have different initial stakes in the firm (φ 0 1 = φ 0 2 ), differ in their initial cash wealth (b 0 1 = b 0 2 ), and differ in their monitoring efficiency (α 1 = α 2 ). We first introduce asymmetry in only one parameter at a time, holding the other parameters fixed. Asymmetry in two parameters is considered in Sect. 4.2.1. We repeated this analysis for different parameter values. With asymmetry in one parameter only, all equilibria obtained were nonfully mixed. The strategy {Monitor and Hold} was never played. 13 As will be described in details below, in these equilibria, either both investors mix between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor}, or one investor mixes between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor} and the other investor plays {Not Monitor} with probability one. The comparative statics results presented below are obtained using the symmetric case with parameter values
05, s = 0.1 as the benchmark, and Q 0 = 0.00001. The qualitative results are not sensitive to the specific parameter values with which they were obtained.
The main results from the analysis of the asymmetric case are that the investor that is larger/cash-wealthier/more efficient in monitoring, monitors more (both frequency and intensity), and that when asymmetry is sufficiently high, the other investor stops monitoring. Figures 5, 6 , and 7 illustrate comparative statics results for the asymmetric case; in each figure asymmetry in a different parameter is introduced. Figure 5 demonstrates that the larger investor monitors more. Intuitively, the larger investor has more shares and thus benefits more from monitoring through value appreciation, whereas the smaller investor has an incentive to free ride. As the asymmetry in ownership becomes high, the smaller investor stops monitoring because he does not have enough shares to benefit on from monitoring, while the larger investor's monitoring becomes similar to the symmetric case, i.e., the larger investor's monitoring increases with ownership through higher frequency but unchanged intensity (see Fig. 2 ). Figure 6 shows that the investor with higher cash wealth monitors more (both frequency and intensity). The wealthier investor has higher incentive to benefit from trade, while the less wealthy investor has an incentive to free ride, as potential gains from informed trade for him are low. As the asymmetry in cash wealth becomes 1 , when the share endowment to investor 2, φ 0 2 , is held fixed. a, b Characterize the equilibrium monitoring of investor 1 and investor 2, respectively. a Shows that for relatively low values of φ 0 1 , investor 1 does not monitor because he does not have enough shares to benefit on from monitoring. As φ 0 1 increases, investor 1's expected monitoring increases. b Shows that investor 2's expected monitoring decreases and as φ 0 1 becomes, relatively high, investor 2 stops monitoring. a Shows that within the range in which both investors monitor, investor 1's monitoring increases both through spending on monitoring when he monitors and through the frequency of monitoring. However, as investor 1 becomes the lead/sole monitor, his monitoring responses to changes in φ 0 1 becomes similar to those in the symmetric case Fig. 2a . Namely, his monitoring increases in frequency, but spending on monitoring when monitoring occurs hardly changes, primarily because of diminishing returns to monitoring. Unlike in the symmetric case, as investor 2 reduces his monitoring and investor 1 becomes the lead monitor, the inefficiencies associated with non-coordinated monitoring disappear. Yet, as in the symmetric case, the aggregate expected monitoring (sum q * c = q 1B c 1B + q 2B c 2B ) moderately increases with φ 0 1 (shown in both a and b) 1 ; moreover, as b 0 1 becomes relatively high, investor 2 stops monitoring. a Shows that within the range in which both investors monitor, investor 1's monitoring increases both through expenditure on monitoring when he monitors and through the frequency of monitoring. However, as investor 1 becomes the lead monitor, his monitoring responses to changes in b 0 1 become similar to those in the symmetric case (Fig. 3a) . Namely, he spends more on monitoring when monitoring occurs, but the frequency with which he monitors actually decreases. As in the symmetric case, the aggregate expected monitoring (sum q * c), Fig. 7 Monitoring under asymmetric monitoring efficiency. This figure describes how equilibrium monitoring strategies of both investors change with the monitoring efficiency of investor 1, α 1 when the monitoring efficiency of investor 2, α 2 , is held fixed. a, b Characterize the equilibrium monitoring of investor 1 and investor 2, respectively. a Shows that, given fixed α 2 , for relatively low values of α 1 investor 1 does not monitor because his monitoring is not effective. As α 1 increases, investor 1's expected monitoring increases. Meanwhile b shows that investor 2's expected monitoring decreases, and, as α 1 becomes relatively high, investor 2 stops monitoring. a Shows that within the range in which both investors monitor, investor 1's monitoring increases both through higher expenditure on monitoring when he monitors and through higher frequency of monitoring. However, as investor 1 becomes the lead monitor, the way his monitoring responds to changes in α 1 become similar to that in the symmetric case Fig. 4a . Namely, his monitoring increases through the frequency of monitoring but spending on monitoring when monitoring occurs decreases, because, as investor 2 stops monitoring, returns to monitoring diminish more quickly with α 1 . Unlike in the symmetric case, here an additional factor comes into play: as investor 1 becomes the sole monitor, the inefficiencies associated with noncoordinated monitoring disappear. As a result, like in the symmetric case, the aggregate expected monitoring (sum q * c), hardly increases with α 1 (shown in  both a, b) high, the investor with less cash stops monitoring because he does not have enough cash to generate the trading gains required to cover the costs of monitoring, whereas the more cash-wealthy investor's monitoring becomes similar to the symmetric case (see Fig. 3 ). That is, the (cash) wealthier investor's monitoring increases through higher intensity rather than the frequency of monitoring. Figure 7 demonstrates that the shareholder whose monitoring is more efficient monitors more (both frequency and intensity). Intuitively, this is because his marginal benefit from monitoring is higher. As the asymmetry in monitoring efficiency becomes high, the shareholder who is less efficient in monitoring stops monitoring and free rides because his monitoring is not efficient enough to induce a sufficient increase in firm value. Meanwhile, the more efficient investor's monitoring becomes similar to the symmetric case (see Fig. 4 ). That is, the more efficient investor's monitoring increases through more frequent monitoring, but with less expenditure on monitoring when he monitors because of diminishing returns to monitoring.
The similarity of the monitoring characteristics (frequency and intensity) of the single large shareholder in Fig. 4 , suggests that the monitoring of multiple large shareholders is similar to the monitoring of a single large shareholder and the monitoring of multiple large shareholders when they can collude, with respect to share holdings, cash holdings, and quality of governance.
Special cases
As noted in Sect. 4.1, the strategy {Monitor and Hold} is never played when large investors are symmetric or when asymmetry involves only one parameter. For a large investor to adopt the strategy {Monitor and Hold}, gains from monitoring should be high in comparison to the potential gains from trade. This requires asymmetry not only in shareholdings but also in cash wealth. Figure 8 describes such a case. The figure demonstrates that when one large investor has more cash while the other owns more shares, the former buys when he monitors and the latter holds when he monitors. The investor that has more cash monitors for trading gains, whereas the investor that has more shares monitors only for value. The share-rich but cash-poor investor has too little cash to benefit on, from trade, in order to justify the extra expenditure on monitoring that would increase the expected firm value above the ask price (which is high because of the adverse selection introduced by the other investor). Noe (2002) Because our paper is essentially an extension of Noe (2002) a comparison is warranted. Noe assumes a fixed level of monitoring. We generalize Noe's model and allow for varying intensity of monitoring. We show that this generalization yields a rich characterization of monitoring in terms of intensity and frequency. Specifically, for a share-rich (holding) investor it may be profitable to lessen intensity and increase frequency but for a cash-rich (trading) investor it may be profitable to increase intensity 
Comparison to
That is, investor 1 is (cash) wealthier than investor 2. We change investor 2's ownership concentration φ 0 2 while investor 1's ownership is fixed to φ 0 1 = 0.1. The figure describes how both investor's monitor. When investor 1 is wealthier than investor 2 and owns more shares he is the sole monitor and mixes between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor} (q 11 is positive while q 12 is zero). As the ownership concentration of investor 2 increases, he also starts monitoring (with positive probability) because his benefits from monitoring through value enhancement becomes significant. However, he holds rather than buys shares when he monitors (q 21 is positive while q 22 is zero). This is because he does not have enough cash to benefit on, from trade, in order to justify the extra expenditure on monitoring that would increase the expected firm value above P A . Investor 1 still mixes between {Monitor and Buy} and {Not Monitor}, but as the asymmetry in ownership concentration changes in favor of investor 2, investor 1 monitors less while investor 2 monitors more and decrease frequency as this makes trading gains greater. This feature just does not emerge in Noe (2002) .
Furthermore, the varying monitoring intensity allows an equilibrium in which among shareholders who monitor, the larger shareholder monitors more, whereas in Noe's model a fixed monitoring intensity yields the counterfactual result that smaller shareholder monitors more. The result that larger shareholders monitor more can only be obtained by allowing investors to vary both the frequency and the intensity of monitoring. Intuitively, in Noe's model, if both shareholders monitor, they monitor with the same intensity and both must be randomizing. The only way the larger shareholder can be deterred from switching to playing a pure strategy of always monitoring, given his larger stake in the firm, is if he thinks that his monitoring will have a smaller effect than monitoring by the small shareholder. Given rational expectations, this is only possible if his monitoring does have a smaller effect than monitoring by the smaller shareholder. This smaller effect is possible only if the small shareholder monitors more. Now, by allowing a variation in monitoring intensity there is another way to lower the marginal gain to the large shareholder sufficiently to prevent switching to the pure strategy of always monitoring: lowering the marginal return from monitoring by raising monitoring intensity.
Another effect of allowing for varying intensity is that monitoring without buying additional shares is sometimes used by the large shareholders. In Noe's model investors always buy shares when they monitor.
Empirical implications
In this section we discuss empirical implications of the results from Sect. 4. The model predicts two general types of activism: high frequency-low intensity and low frequency-high intensity. We argue that activism is indeed characterized in this manner. For example, analysts' coverage and investor relations are high frequency-low intensity forms of activism. They require exerting effort on a regular basis with actions such as telephone calls, memos, presentations and client reports. These actions are relatively inexpensive. In contrast, special meetings, proxy fights and referendums are low frequency-high intensity forms of activism. They tend to be rare events but are time consuming and are relatively costly.
The model predicts that vested (share rich) investors, will engage high frequencylow intensity activism and that their monitoring will be motivated by value enhancement rather than by trading gains. Consider institutional investors. They are generally vested investors and their activism generally relies on continuous analyst coverage and investor relations. They rarely engage in proxy fights or initiate special shareholder meetings. Indeed, Carlton et al. (1998) investigate activism of institutional investors such as TIAA-CREF and SWIB (State of Wisconsin Investment Board), and document that these vested investors focus on "quiet" activism such as investor relations and do not use intensive and public activism such as proxy fights. Their monitoring is long term and enhances shareholders value. Similar findings are documented in Smith (1996) for CalPERS, another large institutional investor. Smith finds that CalPERS is active in the firms it invests in for the long run. CalPERS does not buy or sell abruptly for trading gains, but rather monitors in order to increase value. More recently, Becht et al. (2009) investigate the activism of Hermes, a UK pension fund. They too show that activism by Hermes is ongoing. Hermes monitors the firms it invests in on a regular basis and does not engage in intensive activism such as proxy fights. Consistent with our model, Becht et al. (2009) also show that the activism of Hermes increases firms' value.
On the other hand, the model predicts that cash rich investors will engage low intensity-high frequency activism, and that their monitoring will be motivated by trading gains rather than value enhancement. Consider corporate raiders. They are generally cash rich and short term investors. Raiders tend to monitor rarely but intensively and are motivated to monitor by trading gains (through value appreciation of shares purchased) rather than by firm value enhancement. Typically corporate raiders accumulate shares quietly and then monitor forcefully with proxy fights, special shareholders meetings, and intensive scrutiny of management. Examples include Karl Icahn's activism in Time Warner, and Kirk Kerkorian's activism in General Motors. Another example of low frequency-high intensity activism is the pressure on Deutsche Bourse to abandon its bid for the London Stock Exchange by a London based hedge fund manager who had taken a large stake in the firm, and as was rumored at the time, had also taken a large short position in the London Stock Exchange. More recently, William Ackman, a cash rich investor quickly and quietly accumulated a 9.8% position in Target and then started aggressive activism. Ackman is known for low frequency-high intensity activism and intensive trading, such as his investments in Wendy's and McDonald's. Consistent with the model, Becht et al. (2009) control for collaborative (high frequency-low intensity) vs. confrontational interventions (high intensity-low frequency) activism, and find that collaborative activism enhances value more than confrontational activism. Bradley et al. (2009) investigate activism in closed-end funds. They find that arbitrageurs have become very active in initiating proxy contests and referendums targeted at open-ending or liquidating deeply discounted closed end funds. These findings too, suggest that activism by cash rich investors is associated with intensity and with significant trade. Bradley et al. (2009) find that the terminal firm value is either enhanced or reduced. Our results thus offer an explanation for the ambiguity in earlier empirical studies about the relation between activism and firm value discussed in the introduction. Namely, our model suggests that ownership concentration motivates activism for firm value, whereas cash wealth motivates activism for trading gains and may not enhance firm value.
Although the model is not dynamic, it has implications about how activism strategies change with investment in equity. When a potentially large investor starts to invest in a firm, his ownership is small and his activism is thus focused on trading gains more than on value enhancement (low frequency with high intensity). The new investor might initially purchase shares in the market quietly, and, once becoming a significant shareholder, engage in a one time intensive activism (proxy fight, takeover threat, and special shareholder meeting to remove the incumbent manager). This generally pushes the market price up with the anticipation for improvement. This now-large investor can then exercise trading gains either by selling in the market or by settling on Greenmail. Alternatively, the investor might continue to accumulate shares, in which case the stake in the firm will increase and activism will become more focused on value enhancement than on trading gains (i.e., higher frequency with lower intensity). This prediction is supported by the findings of Becht et al. (2009) . They find that when the institutional investor Hermes makes its first investment in a firm, activism is intense. However, over time, as Hermes becomes vested, its activism becomes less intense but more frequent.
The prediction that better exogenous governance mechanisms lead to higher firm value is also consistent with the empirical evidence. Firms in countries with better exogenous governance mechanisms have higher market valuation, despite greater dispersion of ownership. La Porta et al. (1998) find that across countries, concentration of ownership is negatively related to investor protection. Because both the quality of governance and ownership concentration are exogenous in our model, we cannot investigate the interaction between them. However, the model does predict that higher ownership concentration will result in more spending on monitoring (see Fig. 2a ) while lower α does not (see Fig. 4a ). Because, in the model, firm value is concave in the quality of governance, one implication that can be drawn outside our model is that ownership concentration will be used to incentivize higher spending on monitoring when quality of governance is low, consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) . Bebchuk et al. (2009) concludes that when governance quality is high, firm value is enhanced with less exercise of power, and Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that higher quality of governance results in higher firm value. We are unaware of empirical investigations that study the relation between the quality of governance mechanism and the style of activism. The model predicts, for example, that in countries with better investor protection through laws and regulations, such as the US and the UK, large shareholder activism will be characterized with analysts coverage and investor relations (high frequency-low intensity) more than with proxy fights and management scrutiny (low frequency-high intensity) in comparison to countries with poor investor protection. Similarly, the model predicts that following legislation that improves the quality of laws and regulations such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, large shareholder activism will become more frequent and less intense.
Our analysis of asymmetric equilibria predicts that the investors who are larger, cash-wealthier, or more efficient in monitoring are more active. We are not aware of any systematic empirical investigation into activism within the group of large shareholders. The prediction that, among the large shareholders, the larger ones monitor more is different from the prediction in Noe (2002) that, among the large shareholders, the smaller ones monitor more. As in Noe (2002) , the prediction that larger shareholders monitor even when smaller shareholders do not implies that free riding does not necessarily discourage activism, because investors who monitor can benefit not only from an increase in firm value, but also from trade.
The result that the monitoring of a single large shareholder is similar to the monitoring of multiple symmetric large shareholders has important implications. It predicts, for example, that if two large shareholders were initially monitoring the management separately and then begin to cooperate, the qualitative characteristics of their activism will not change. We are not aware of any empirical investigation of this prediction and suggest this as an interesting direction for further research.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated how large investors execute their activism (monitoring) under diminishing returns to monitoring when financial markets are available, recognizing two dimensions of activism: frequency and intensity. We characterize how ownership concentration, cash wealth, and the quality of exogenous governance mechanisms (laws, regulations) affect activism and firm value. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we find that activism does not always lead to appreciation in firm value. Specifically, ownership concentration motivates activism to enhance firm value, whereas cash-wealth motivates activism for trading gains. We also suggest that better exogenous governance mechanisms lead to higher valuation through more frequent but less intense activism. When asymmetries within the group of large shareholders exist, the model predicts that the investor that is larger/cash-wealthier/more efficient in monitoring is more active. An interesting implication of the model is that monitoring styles of multiple large shareholders are similar whether or not they cooperate and that these styles are similar to those of a single large shareholder.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Because it is always true that p A > Q 0 (otherwise the market maker is making a positive profit) then shareholding strategy φ i is bounded and closed by (2). By an earlier assumption, the monitoring strategy c i is also bounded and closed. Hence, because the strategy space {( i , C i ), i = 1, 2} is a nonempty compact subset of a metric space, and the payoff functions u i are continuous, by theorem (Glicksberg 1952) there exists a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies. 14 Proof of Lemma 1 Multiply the market maker zero-profit condition ( 6) by p A to get
and rearrange to get (9).
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider investor 1's optimization problem in (4). 
and linear and increasing
and therefore is convex over
for all c i > 0, and
can be either larger or smaller thanφ 1 ). Hence the summation must be convex on each of the
Convexity implies that the optimum is attained on extreme points, so, for investor 1, optimal shareholding is either 0, φ 0 1 , orφ 1 , for all (c 1 , C 2 ).
14 The strategy space is compact since we have assumed that the amount of money available for monitoring is fixed and becauseφ is bounded since p A Q 0 . For a more detailed discussion of existence of Nash equilibrium see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 35-36. (In the special case of linearity with zero slope, any choice of φ 1 is optimal, hence 0, φ 0 1 , andφ 1 are also optimal. By making the reasonable assumption that whenever indifferent, investor i holds, this pathological case can be ignored.) With a symmetric argument, optimal shareholding choice for investor 2 is either 0, φ 0 2 , orφ 2 , for all (C 1 , c 2 ). 
Proof of Lemma

Proof of Lemma 4
We show that, when they monitor, each investor chooses a specific monitoring level. This level depends on whether the investor holds or buys. Without loss of generality, consider investor 1's strategy (on monitoring) C 1 = {c 1 j } n j=1 with respective probabilities {P 1 j } n j=1 , given investor 2's strategy C 2 = {c 2k } m k=1 with respective probabilities {P 2k } m k=1 . Then
By strict concavity of the monitoring function, Q in C 2 , we have that, for all j,
wherec 2 = m k=1 c 2k P 2k and hence
By Lemma 3, when he monitors, optimally, investor 1 either holds (φ 1 = φ 0 1 , b 1 = b 0 1 ) or uses all his wealth to buy stock ( φ 1 =φ,
where I j {B} and I j {H } are the indicator functions on whether investor 1's strategy is {Monitor and Buy} and {Monitor and Hold} in state j respectively, and where P 1B and P 1H are the aggregate (unconditional) probabilities that investor 1's strategy is {Monitor and Buy} and {Monitor and Hold} in state j, respectively.
From (30) we can conclude that, given investor 1's choice of shareholding level (buy or hold), there is a specific monitoring level for this investor that strictly dominates any strategy that involves mixing on the monitoring level. However, the level of monitoring may be different depending on whether he buys or holds. The only situation where we may have mixing on positive monitoring level is when the investor is indifferent between {Monitor and Buy} and {Monitor and Hold}.
Proof of Theorem 1
We need to show that we can rule out the pure strategies (C 1 , C 2 ) for fixed values c i ≥ 0. There are four strategies to consider: (0, 0), (c 1 , 0), (0, c 2 ), and (c 1 , c 2 ), for c 1 > 0, c 2 > 0. First, the strategy profile (0, 0) (i.e., both investors never monitor with probability 1) is ruled out because in this case the market maker sets
The stock is almost free (since Q 0 was earlier assumed to be very small however positive for compactness), so someone will deviate and buy and profit from monitoring since by earlier assumption ∂ Q (0, 0) /∂c i > 1. Also, we can rule out (c 1 , 0) (i.e., investor 1 monitors with probability 1 and investor 2 does not monitor). (14) and (15) hold. So suppose, alternatively, that 0 < 1 − q * i B − q * i H < 1, i.e., {Not Monitor} is part of the equilibrium strategy. Then, in turn, it must be the case that neither the strategy {Monitor and Buy} nor the strategy {Monitor and Hold} yield a higher profit than the strategy {Not Monitor}. That is, for investor i, both M P * i B − C * i B ≤ 0 and M P * i H − C * i H ≤ 0. If M P * i B − C * i B < 0, then {Monitor and Buy} cannot be part of the equilibrium strategy because it yields strictly lower profit than {Not Monitor}. Thus, it must be the case that q * i B = 0, which establishes (14). Similarly, if M P * i H − C * i H < 0, then {Monitor and Hold} cannot be part of the equilibrium strategy because it yields a strictly lower profit than {Not Monitor}; that is, it must be the case that q * i H = 0, establishing (15). 
Proof of Lemma 6
E[d * S ] = E[d * S1 ] + E[d * S2 ] = E[(φ 0 1 − φ 1N M ) + (φ 0 2 − φ 2N M )] = (1 − q 1B − q 1H )(φ 0 1 − φ 1N M ) + (1 − q 2B − q 2H )(φ 0 2 − φ 2N M ).= (1 − q 1B − q 1H )(φ 0 1 − φ 1N M ) 1 − E[e −α 2 C 2 ] + (1 − q 2B − q 2H )(φ 0 2 − φ 2N M ) 1 − E[e −α 1 C 1 ] .
Proof of Lemma 7
Consider the maximand in (4):
To find c * 1B (monitoring level for investor 1, given that he monitors and buys), recall our earlier result that, when investor 1 monitors and buys, he chooses φ 1 =φ 1 , hence b 1 = 0. Recall that b 1 is equal to the first term in (31). His expected utility is thus
where the first term on the right hand side of the last equality reflects investor 1's expectation over the three states {q 2B , C 2 = c 2B > 0}, {q 2H , C 2 = c 2H > 0}, and {(1 − q 2B − q 2H ), C 2 = 0}. To maximize his expected utility, investor 1 solves
Use (16) to write
Substitute (32) and (34) Rearrange to get (26). The equilibrium monitoring levels c * 1H , c * 2B , and c * 2H can be found to be (27)-(29), respectively, using a similar analysis. 
and use (12) and (13) 
where, based on Eqs. (10) and (11) 
v * +2B , v * +2H , v * −2 are defined symmetrically. Substitute into (47)-(50) and rearrange to get Eqs. (43)- (46), the last four equations of Proposition 3.
